dailypost.ng

dailypost.ng

— Says NADECO lobbied for extension; military not ready to cede power to civilians

By Johnbosco Agbakwuru

ABUJA — Former Military Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, has said that he abandoned the late General Sani Abacha’s transition programme because it lacked credibility.

Abubakar, who took over government after the death of the then head of state, Abacha, also said that he resisted lobbying from the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) to extend the transition programme.

The former Head of State, in his autobiography presented to the public on Saturday on the occasion of his 84th birthday at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, said some military officers were against ceding power to civilians.

According to him: “Before the death of General Sani Abacha, he had announced that Nigeria was going to transition from military rule to democracy by 1 October 1998. Legislative elections had been held and winners announced. There were no governorship elections yet. Nobody was clear about the presidential elections.

“All five political parties had adopted Abacha as their joint presidential candidate, even though he was not a member of any of them and had not openly declared his intentions. It was generally believed that he was going to transmute from Head of State to civilian President.

Abacha transition programme lacked credibility

“This was the situation when he died on 8 June 1998 and I assumed power as his successor. I had no interest whatsoever in politics. The Abacha transition programme obviously lacked credibility. There was no way we were going to continue with it.

“We needed to reset the system and the 1 October 1998 handover date was no longer feasible if we were to do a decent job. Looking at the situation on the ground, we found it necessary to make the transition programme as short as possible. This conclusion was reached after we had consulted widely with civilians and within the military.

“My first suggestion was that we should draw up a six-month transition plan. That would have seen us hand over to a democratically elected president by March 1999.

“However, when I called for a meeting with the military echelon and the judiciary, Justice Muhammadu Uwais, then Chief Justice of Nigeria, said he would need at least sixty days after the elections to ensure that all the judicial matters brought to the courts were dispensed with before inauguration.

“That was how we arrived at May 1999. It was a function of a judicial request and my desire to make the transition process as short as possible. Six months was the fastest we could do to organise elections and give the political parties time to set up and prepare.”

General Abubakar said there was immense pressure from different quarters, including some heads of state from the West African sub-region and some in the international community, to extend the transition programme.

He said: “Initially there was intense pressure from some of my colleagues, some heads of state in the West African sub-region and some in the international community that it was too soon to transition to democracy.

“Surprisingly, there were pressures from some NADECO members too. They had at first been wary because the fingers of a lot of politicians were burnt by my predecessor, who promised that they were going to hand over power to civilians but reneged. Several politicians were barred from contesting elections in the process. So, some were very cautious about our programme.

“Two to three months into my administration, some NADECO members realised that I was sincere about the handover date, and they saw themselves as short-changed because they were not politicking as they should have done.

“They felt they had missed the train and wanted to come on board, which made them request more time to get their act together. They came to me as a group, and I reminded them that I had made a covenant with Nigerians and the international community about the commitment to ensure a smooth transition to democracy.

“I asked that if they wanted me to extend the transition programme, I needed them to accede to some requests. One, I demanded that they should write a letter to me requesting an extension of the transition programme. Two, I suggested that they should call a press conference indicating that they had asked the government to extend the transition programme. I promised that if they did that, I would grant an extension. But they never did. I knew they wouldn’t; we went ahead with our programme.”

He said that some sections of the international community believed in his administration.

“Some sections of the international community believed in my administration and saw that we had brought stability and peace to the country. There had been frequent demonstrations before General Abacha died, and some were violent. But within a month or two into the life of our administration, the protests eased, and there was peace.

“Also, some of the sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the international community were relaxed. Some foreign leaders felt that if we had continued in office, there would be reasonable peace in the country. These were reasons why they wanted me to stay longer in power.

Military hostility to ceding power to civilians

“Some of my military colleagues were hostile to the idea of ceding power to civilians, but we were determined to honour our promise. For me, I was not in any way tempted to stay longer in office. I had made up my mind. By the time I took over the reins of power the country was on the edge. There was extreme pressure from NADECO, G-34, and other political players for the military to go. Nigeria was at a breaking point.

“The military needed to relinquish power. Many people did not realise the military was the greatest loser in the whole enterprise because most of our best brains were deployed to administer the country while the profession was neglected. We needed to go back to where we belong and reprofessionalise the armed forces.

“Also, discipline had been eroded in the military. It was common to see a junior officer appointed as the military administrator of a state lording it over his seniors.

“For example, the brigade commander or General Officer Commanding (GOC) is the most senior military officer in a state and was always senior to a military administrator in military hierarchy. But when a national event that was political in nature was being held in a state, the senior officer had to wait for the military administrator to arrive at the ceremony venue before doing anything. These contradictions affected the military tradition of seniority and discipline.

“Worse still, because of the political situation in the country, you found that even in the military some officers were polarised along their states of origin, ethnic groups, and religions. This was not only damaging to what the military stands for, it was also very dangerous. The entire country is the constituency of military personnel.

“Divisions and differences along ethnic and religious lines would always lead to trouble. We all agreed that we needed to nip this trend in the bud to avoid catastrophic consequences for the country. The military truly lost out by getting involved in politics.”

General Abubakar said the transition programme encountered some challenges, but his sincerity and determination to do the right thing played a major role in delivering a successful programme.

“One of the challenges was the decision of the biggest political bloc in the South-Western part of the country to form a party of its own. We were hoping they would join hands with other parts of Nigeria to form national parties, but NADECO and Afenifere, the cultural organisation, formed the Alliance for Democracy (AD) instead and were clearly set to take control of the South West where the late MKO Abiola came from.”

The post Why I dumped Abacha’s transition programme – Gen. Abdulsalami appeared first on Vanguard News.

www.vanguardngr.com