When Halidu Musa received a phone call on the afternoon of 30 July 2025, he did not expect it to be the last time he would hear his father’s voice alive. His father, Musa Yatsu, the vigilante commander of Gurfata village in Gwagwalada Local Government Area of Abuja, had gone to the farm with colleagues to verify reports of renewed destruction of crops allegedly linked to herders. Moments into the call, Halidu said the conversation turned chaotic as gunshots erupted in the background and voices shouted warnings that they were under attack. In what would become his final conversation with his father, Halidu recalled hearing him struggle to communicate as violence unfolded around him.

By evening, Musa Yatsu was dead. His killing would become one of the most defining moments in a chain of violence that residents say did not begin in 2025 but had been building for years through unresolved land disputes, misinformation, weak mediation structures, and what both farmers and herders describe as abandoned peace agreements that were never fully enforced.

Interviews with community leaders, farmers, herders, security officials, and victims’ families indicate that the crisis in Gurfata did not begin with killing but with disputes over land use and access between farmers and herders. The traditional ruler of Gurfata, Adamu Pada, said the immediate trigger began between June and July 2025 when herders allegedly attempted to create a passage through cultivated farmland. According to him, farmers rejected the attempt, leading to a confrontation that was eventually separated, but not resolved.

The disagreement, however, did not end there. Residents say a second confrontation occurred shortly after, during which a farmer was allegedly attacked with a machete and taken to the hospital, where he later died the same day. That death, according to several accounts, marked a turning point in the escalation of tensions in the community as fear and suspicion deepened on both sides.

While the community was still mourning, another incident unfolded along the same stretch of the farming corridor. Halidu Musa said vigilantes were deployed after renewed reports that farms were being destroyed. He explained that the team, which included his father, went to document what was happening on the ground in order to report back to authorities. However, instead of documentation, the mission ended in violence when the vigilantes reportedly walked into an ambush. Mr Pada said the herders had hidden in the bush and launched a sudden attack that led to the killing of Musa Yatsu, the vigilante commander. Residents claim that at least nine individuals were identified in connection with the attack, although arrests remain disputed within the community. Mr Pada insisted that those responsible were known but had not been arrested, while the police maintain a different position.

The Nigeria Police Force, through the FCT Police Public Relations Officer, Josephine Adeh, said farmer–herder disputes in the area are usually handled through mediation rather than prosecution. She explained that whenever incidents are reported, both parties are invited for dialogue aimed at settlement, adding that no arrests were made in relation to the recent killings. This position, however, contrasts with the accounts of residents who believe that the absence of prosecutions has contributed to a sense of impunity and recurring violence.

The violence in Gurfata has left behind a long and painful trail of deaths and injuries spanning several years. Community accounts indicate that as far back as 2020, residents such as Labaran Musa sustained injuries in farmland-related confrontations, while in 2024, Shuaibu Gimba was also injured in a similar incident. In May 2025, Hamza Yakubu was killed, followed in June by a series of injuries involving Abdul Abubakar, Auwal Musa Lana, and Abraham Moses, also known as Manya. The escalation reached its peak in July 2025 when Dahiru Yakubu was killed on 29 July, followed by the killing of Musa Yatsu on 30 July, the same day Isa’ac Abubakar sustained gunshot injuries and Sa’ad Yakubu was also injured. For families affected, these are not isolated statistics but repeated losses that have reshaped entire households and deepened distrust in the possibility of lasting peace.

A relative of Dahiru Yakubu said the killings were preceded by years of unresolved disputes over farmland boundaries and repeated cases of crop destruction. He explained that despite repeated complaints to both community leaders and police authorities, no lasting solution was achieved, leaving residents increasingly frustrated and vulnerable to further escalation.

The herders, however, present a different interpretation of the conflict. The Chairman of Miyetti Allah in Gwagwalada, Ibrahim Chiroma, said increasing expansion of farmlands has significantly reduced available grazing routes, forcing cattle into closer contact with cultivated land. He argued that this pressure has made coexistence more difficult and stressed that earlier informal systems of dispute resolution, where farmers and herders directly negotiated compensation for damage, have broken down over time. He also said that livestock deaths caused by suspected poisoning have increased, and that over one hundred cattle may have been lost, although this figure could not be independently verified.

Security agencies and community leaders confirmed that multiple peace meetings were held in Gurfata involving traditional rulers, security agencies, and local authorities. The Officer-in-Charge of the State Security Service (SSS) in Gwagwalada, Sarah Ebeh, said early warning signals usually trigger immediate intervention and that meetings are often convened between both parties whenever tensions rise. She confirmed that a peace accord was reached but declined to disclose its contents, describing it as confidential. She also stated that since the intervention, the SSS had not received any new complaints, although residents dispute this claim, insisting that tensions remain and that cattle continue to enter farmland in some areas.

Efforts to obtain full responses from the Gwagwalada Area Council revealed partial disclosure. The media aide to the chairman, Ibrahim Yamawo, said the administration intervened in collaboration with security advisers and confirmed that a farmer–herder peace committee was established to address recurring tensions. However, he also acknowledged that no compensation had been made to victims or affected families despite the reported losses and destruction. Repeated attempts to obtain further clarification from the council leadership were unsuccessful.

Across all interviews conducted in Gurfata, three recurring issues emerge as central to the escalation of the conflict. Residents describe how misinformation and rumours of retaliation often spread quickly between farms and settlements, shaping perceptions before facts could be verified. Mr Pada, the community head, explained that rumours of impending attacks frequently circulate within the community, creating fear and heightening tensions even before formal mediation can take place. Farmers, on the other hand, argue that misinformation is also reinforced when reports of farm destruction are either delayed or dismissed, allowing frustration to build. Herders say they are also affected by misinformation, particularly allegations of deliberate cattle poisoning, which they argue fuels suspicion and retaliatory thinking.

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The second recurring issue is the weak enforcement of peace agreements. While both sides confirm that peace accords have been signed at different times, there appears to be little or no structured monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance or address violations when they occur. The third issue is the reactive nature of security interventions, in which authorities tend to respond after violence has already escalated rather than preventing it at the early warning stage.

For Halidu Musa, the crisis is no longer a policy discussion but a personal loss that defines the reality of Gurfata. He said his father went to the farm not as a fighter but as a documenter of destruction, believing that official intervention would follow. Instead, he was killed in the line of duty, leaving behind a family and a community still searching for answers.

The Gurfata crisis ultimately exposes a deeper governance gap in rural conflict management, where repeated mediation efforts are not matched with enforcement, early warning systems are not backed by preventive action, and peace agreements exist without accountability mechanisms to sustain them. Today, the community remains caught between competing realities, with farmers insisting their land is under pressure, herders arguing that grazing routes are shrinking, and institutions maintaining that peace exists even as residents continue to live with fear and uncertainty. In that gap between agreement and enforcement, the violence in Gurfata continues to find space.

(This report was commissioned with support from the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development (CJID) under a journalism support initiative funded by the Open Society Foundations.)

Africa’s next food crisis may not begin on the farm, but in a distant shipping lane. With the Iran war, international attention has focused on oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz and related shortages or price spikes in energy and fuel. Less visible is another vulnerability moving through the same corridor: the fertilisers underpinning global food production.

Fertiliser supply disruptions feed directly into food prices and agricultural output, and most African countries have high import volumes and are ill-positioned to absorb the shock. Domestic production in Africa is insufficient to meet the growing demand.

Production capacity exists in parts of North and West Africa, driven by massive phosphate deposits and natural gas reserves. Morocco leads in phosphates, accounting for over 50 per cent of Africa’s supply and ranks among the top five global phosphate fertiliser exporters, while Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria dominate in nitrogenous (urea) fertiliser production.

A significant share of global fertiliser output is tied to energy-rich regions, particularly in the Gulf. The Middle East is a major hub for nitrogen-based fertilisers, reflecting the local availability of natural gas, which underpins ammonia and urea production.

The Strait of Hormuz connects these production hubs to global markets through a single, highly exposed shipping route. Almost 50 per cent of the globally traded sulphur used in phosphate fertilisers moves through it, making it a critical corridor for global agricultural inputs.

In parts of the Gulf, fertiliser plants have reduced output or paused operations. Even major producers like Morocco’s OCP Group are affected.

Fertiliser production relies on critical inputs like sulphur, much of which is sourced from the Persian Gulf, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, regions entangled in these disrupted trade routes. As sulphur supply tightens, production cannot be scaled up, even where phosphate reserves are abundant, and domestic logistics remain intact.

Constrained production will also erode export revenues for Africa’s major fertiliser exporters. Morocco and Egypt, together accounting for roughly 70 per cent of the continent’s fertiliser exports, could be disproportionately affected. At the same time, net importers, like Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, face heightened risks of food inflation and declining crop yields.

The combined effect is a dual shock: export earnings weaken for producers, while import-dependent economies absorb rising costs and agricultural stress, amplifying macroeconomic and food security pressures.

Urea prices have surged from just under $500 per tonne before the conflict to above $700 per tonne in recent weeks. In South Africa, where roughly 80 per cent of crop production inputs are imported, and fertiliser constitutes a major share, grain farmers face input cost increases of up to 35 per cent. As Africa’s largest supplier of packaged foods, these pressures will likely transmit through the food system, worsening inflation.

Disruptions place disproportionate pressure on Africa’s low-industrialised farming systems. Fertiliser use remains far below global levels, averaging just 17 kg to 23 kg per hectare compared with a global average of 135 kg per hectare, reflecting persistent constraints on affordability and access. Reduced access to fertiliser is likely to lower application rates, with direct knock-on effects on crop yields and overall production across the growing season.

The stakes are particularly high given the central role of agriculture in African economies. The sector employs between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the workforce, with rates exceeding 80 per cent in countries like Burundi, Malawi and Madagascar. However, it is dominated by smallholder farmers with limited capacity to absorb rising input costs or supply disruptions, making them acutely vulnerable to fertiliser shocks.

The lesson is not only about exposure tied to price volatility risks. It is also one of the structural vulnerabilities and untapped capacities. Africa holds many of the inputs required to reduce this dependency: natural gas reserves in Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania and Senegal; significant phosphate resources in Morocco and Tunisia; and rapidly growing demand driven by the need to boost agricultural productivity and contain food crises.

Converting this resource base into production and supply capacity is achievable, but requires focusing on three priorities.

First, production must be scaled strategically. Not every country needs to produce fertiliser, but a core group with comparative advantages could anchor regional supply. Second, markets must be integrated. Without efficient cross-border trade, lower transport costs and reliable distribution, increased production won’t translate into access. The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement provides a ready framework, but it must be operationalised.

Third, fertiliser policy must extend beyond production. Supply depends on functioning ecosystems: storage, blending, transport, finance and last-mile delivery. Without these, fertiliser will not reach farmers at scale. These segments create space for local entrepreneurship. The growth of agri-tech platforms such as Hello Tractor and Apollo Agriculture shows what’s possible, but these remain the exception, not the norm.

Self-sufficiency is neither feasible nor necessary. However, the current disruption exposes the cost of leaving a strategic input to external markets. Greater regional capacity would not eliminate global exposure, but would reduce the extent to which distant crises dictate African food systems.

The Hormuz shock is a warning about the fragility of supply chains. It exposes a persistent blind spot in agricultural policy debates. While financing gaps and farm-level productivity dominate the agenda, less attention is given to upstream supply chains that shape access to critical inputs such as fertiliser.

It’s a reminder that agricultural stability and food security depend not just on seeds, rainfall and land, but on whether Africa can build the industrial foundations that address the fertiliser system deficit and make food production less vulnerable to external dependencies.

A previous version of this article was published in Africa Tomorrow, the blog of the ISS African Futures and Innovation Programme.

Julia Baum, Website Consultant and Marvellous Ngundu, Research Consultant, Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).

The National Biosafety Management Agency (NBMA) says it has ordered the suspension of four new transgenic cotton hybrid varieties in Nigeria.

The varieties are MIC 561 BGII, MIC 563 BGII, BIOSEED-FIYAH CH1001, and BIOSEED-FIYAH CH1002. They were allegedly registered by the National Committee on Naming, Registration and Release of Crop Varieties, Livestock Breeds and Fisheries on 26 March 2026 without the requisite approval of NBMA.

In a statement issued Tuesday and signed by NBMA’s Head of Information and Public Relations, Gloria Ogbaki, the agency said its regulatory surveillance and compliance-monitoring mechanisms identified “serious compliance abnormalities” in the varieties.

“The National Biosafety Management Agency (NBMA) wishes to inform the public of recent developments concerning the registration of four new transgenic cotton hybrid varieties in Nigeria – MIC 561 BGII, MIC 563 BGII, BIOSEED-FIYAH CH1001, BIOSEED-FIYAH CH1002,” the statement said.

Background

Genetically modified (GM) crops are plants whose DNA has been altered using genetic engineering to introduce desirable traits such as resistance to pests, diseases, or environmental conditions, as well as improved nutritional value.

In Nigeria, the adoption of GM crops has remained contentious. While proponents argue that the technology can boost food production and enhance food security, critics have raised concerns about environmental and health risks, weak regulatory enforcement, and inadequate labelling.

According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), more than 30 major food crops have been genetically modified globally. Nigeria has approved four crops—maize, cowpea, cotton, and soybean—for commercialisation and is among six African countries leading in biotech crop adoption.

In 2024, the government approved four varieties of Tela maize, further intensifying debates over GM crop safety and transparency.

Concerns also persist over farmers’ limited knowledge of GM seed characteristics, potential dependence on seed companies, and the broader impact on traditional farming systems.

An investigation by PREMIUM TIMES and international partners in 2024 revealed how the U.S. government, through the now-defunct USAID, funded pesticide and GM-related advocacy campaigns in Nigeria, including efforts that profiled critics of GMOs.

As debates continue, the suspension of the new cotton varieties underscores ongoing challenges around biosafety compliance and regulatory oversight in Nigeria’s biotechnology sector.

Findings

The agency said its findings confirmed that confined field trials and related activities involving the varieties were conducted without prior authorisation, inspection, or regulatory oversight.

“At no time did the National Biosafety Management Agency grant any approval for the confined field trials, multi-locational trials, or commercial release of the new GM cotton varieties,” the statement said.

Under the NBMA Act, the agency said, no person or institution is permitted to conduct confined field trials, multi-locational trials, or the commercial release of genetically modified organisms without its explicit approval.

It added that any action outside this framework constitutes a violation of national biosafety regulations.

NBMA said it has directed the National Committee on Naming, Registration and Release of Crop Varieties, Livestock Breeds and Fisheries to suspend further action on the varieties pending the outcome of ongoing investigations.

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“The Agency will apply all appropriate regulatory measures and sanctions as provided under the law,” the statement added.

The agency assured Nigerians that it is handling the matter with seriousness.

“There is no evidence at this time of any immediate risk to public health or the environment and all necessary steps are being taken to ensure continued safety and regulatory integrity,” the statement said.

NBMA reiterated its commitment to ensuring that biotechnology activities in Nigeria comply with national laws and international best practices, adding that the public will be kept informed as investigations progress.